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Property Panel

Property Rights:
A View from the Trenches
Michael A. Hellert

How do governments create - or in some countries recreate - basic
property rights that citizens demand in the transition to a market economy?
My first comment, quite briefly, is on the debate within this Symposium on
the relationship between constitutional reforms and the emergence of new
property regimes. Second, I will comment on the counterintuitive property
rights regime that is emerging from the "big bang" - the post-1989 collapse
of the old socialist legal order in Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union and its replacement with a new, market-oriented system of
property rights.
From my experience working with socialist countries in transition,
constitutional debates have had little to do with the creation of property rights.
For example, in Hungary, the right of individual property owners to
compensation in the event of expropriation, enshrined in the current
democratic version of the Constitution,' was also guaranteed by the socialist
versions of the Constitution. 2 Writing constitutions seems much less vital than
creating the nuts and bolts of legal infrastructure that underlie ordinary
transactions, like selling, mortgaging, or renting an apartment.' None of the
government officials with whom I work refer to their constitutions when
creating property registration laws, institutions for condominium management,
foreclosure and eviction procedures, subdivision regulations, and dispute
resolution mechanisms.

t Consultant, World Bank, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1989, Stanford University; A.B. 1985, Harvard
College. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank,
members of its Board of Executive Directors, its affiliated institutions, or the countries they represent. My
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Turning to the "big bang," the emerging property rights systems are
counterintuitive because they are so utterly conventional. American law or
economics professors, who work with countries in transition, often view
reforms as a grand experiment and an opportunity to discuss property in an
aspirational sense - to suggest new types of property rights that meld
together market mechanisms with more equitable, perhaps socialist, rights. 4
For example, one commentator notes, "Tolstoy saw the importance of the land
issue in Russian life. He knew that reconciliation would require a new
concept, neither capitalist nor socialist, but a synthesis of both. Now 80 years
after his plea for a land policy based on the ideas of Henry George, the
Soviets have another opportunity."' Nevertheless, in every country where I
have worked - from Albania to Russia - there appears to be little interest
among reformers in these aspirational experiments to recast the bundle of
property rights. The fights are practical: central governments, local governments, enterprises, and individuals accept a laissez-faire conception of
property rights and then struggle to gain control of particular assets.
At least in these early stages of transition, the pendulum has swung from
one utopia to the other, from a socialist to a nineteenth-century vision of
property rights. Even after forty years of socialism (over seventy years in
Russia's case), people seem to possess an intuitive, implicit understanding of
"ownership" that resonates within the spectrum of traditional understandings
of property rights in Western market economies. Governments are now
moving to adopt this intuitive approach to ownership with a comprehensive
framework of legal instruments and institutions that structure the "rules of the
game" in Western market terms. There is still little sensitivity to the balance
between public and private rights that has emerged in Western legal systems.
Reforming socialist countries, however, may well adopt this distinction in a
later stage of the transitional process.
Let me refer to my own experience. In one country, I was working with
a team trying to establish a housing finance system that would help mobilize
funds to rehabilitate beautiful old buildings in the capital's historic core. We
structured the proposal, however, so that rehabilitation would not be financed
by gentrification. We designed a mechanism for cross-subsidizing those who
could not otherwise afford to remain in their apartments, primarily pensioners.
In rejecting the proposal, one local mayor accused us of being communists for
incorporating a social safety net and subsidy for vulnerable groups, an unusual
criticism to level at a World Bank team.

4. See, e.g., Nicolaus Tideman et al., Open Letterto MikhailGorbachev (Nov. 7, 1990) (on file with

author) (about 30 signatories, mostly American professors of economics or law, advocating Georgist
concept that Soviet Union not privatize land, but instead have local governments determine and collect
annual rents from land users).

5. E. Robert Scrofani, Soviets Should Try Henry GeorgeLand Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991,
at A20 (letter to editor).
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Housing provides a good example with which to analyze the strength of
the current push to create practical, conventional property rights and
institutions that transform socialist renters to private property owners. Under
the socialist system, households could not own or sell their apartments. Unless
they were moved for administrative convenience or punishment, however,
they had lifelong tenancy, which they could pass on to their children. Rent
was nominal, as was maintenance; eviction for non-payment was unknown.
The combination of socialist property interests made mobility virtually
impossible. Generations of families, including ex-spouses, were often trapped
in a single, small apartment. Today, people know what they want: to get their
apartment unit, vacation dacha, or piece of farmland away from the hands of
the state; to own, sell, or improve it; to build new structures or enterprises.
They want a transparent, simple, and inexpensive legal system that will allow
them to do so, with little decisionmaking discretion left for public officials.
Why has such a traditional vision of property rights emerged? Of course,
Western countries have had a great effect, both directly and indirectly. First,
reforming governments have sought out Western legal approaches for the sake
of efficiency: applying ready-made models requires less effort than reinventing
a legal system. Second, Western governments, enterprises, and banks have
reinforced this approach by preconditioning foreign investments and loans on
the adoption of such a familiar set of ownership patterns. Aid agencies, law
firms, professors, and consultants have also stepped in with drafts of
legislation. A third explanation is more historical. In countries like Poland and
Hungary, people conceptualize the transition experience less as the creation
of property rights than as the reclaiming and updating of property rights that
were taken away within their living memory.
Yet, something more than constitutional debate, Western pressure,
efficiency concerns, and history explains the conventional set of property
rights emerging in reforming socialist countries. For instance, the practices
of newly established real estate brokers in remote parts of Siberia - without
exposure to Western consultants, reformist officials, or any history of
individual land ownership - would be quite familiar to Americans. The
transition experience in these countries suggests to me, not the indeterminacy
or unpredictability of market property rights, but rather a broadly shared
understanding of the fundamentals of property that is relatively stable across
cultures. Our common task as outside observers and advisors should be to
reinforce this understanding by providing practical examples of legal tools,
procedures, and institutions from a range of market economies, rather than to
promote more noble experiments.

